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IN TR O D U C TIO N
In the mental lexicon of speakers who know it, the word wombat should have 
a relatively simple entry, in which a single sound representation— [wDmbaet] 
or something more abstract— is linked to a meaning representation along the 
lines of ‘small Australian marsupial mammal’. The lexical representations of 
many other words, however, are likely to be a great deal more complex. 
Ambiguous words, such as bark , for instance, must have more than one 
semantic representation associated with a single sound representation. 
Idiomatic expressions, such as break the ice, convey a meaning which is not 
expressible as a direct function of the words which comprise them, and if they 
are listed as single units, then their lexical representation incorporates a 
degree of syntactic complexity. Derived words, consisting of a stem with 
prefixes and/or suffixes, may represent this morphological structure in their 
lexical entry: on this dimension the lexical representation of, say, emit would 
be more complex than that of emir.
Loosely speaking, then, lexical representations can vary in complexity on at 
least three dimensions: semantic, syntactic, and morphological. The existence 
of complex representations of all three types has been specifically claimed: 
‘Both (all) interpretations of an ambiguous word are always activated’ (Foss 
and Jenkins, 1973); ‘Idioms are stored and accessed as lexical items’ 
(Swinney and Cutler, 1979); ‘Morphological decomposition is involved in the 
storage and retrieval of lexical items’ (Taft and Forster, 1975).
Clearly, there are fundamental differences between the phenomena which 
have here been given the summary title ‘lexical complexity’. Ambiguous 
words, and idioms, are complex in the sense that they can call up more than
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one semantic representation in the lexicon; morphologically complex words, 
on the other hand, have a unitary semantic representation, but are complex in 
that different parts of the word may correspond to different parts of the 
semantic representation. Nevertheless, in this chapter ‘lexical complexity’ will 
for the purposes of the argument be treated as a unitary phenomenon. A 
negative definition is that lexical complexity occurs wherever lexical entries 
are not simple; lexical simplicity is the case when a phonetic representation of 
a word evokes a single lexical entry which contains only a single word class 
representation and a single semantic representation. The existing evidence on 
this heterogeneous phenomenon (plus some fresh evidence to be presented 
below) does in fact, it will be argued, produce a coherent picture; these vastly 
different kinds of complexity indeed have something in common. Two 
questions will be posed in this investigation: (a) can there be mental 
representations of words which are complex in the way that has been claimed? 
and (b) if so, are words with complex lexical entries in any way more 
difficult to retrieve from the mental lexicon than words with simple entries? It 
will be argued, to cut the next twenty-odd pages short, that the answer to (a) 
is ‘yes’, the answer to (b) ‘no1.
The evidence on which these conclusions are based is extensive and varied. 
Clearly, the two questions raise different methodological issues; whereas an 
answer to (a) can be sought via a variety of tasks which measure priming and 
interference, (b) requires the use of specific techniques to assess lexical access 
difficulty. Since it is to be argued that lexical complexity exerts no effect on 
difficulty of lexical access, it is appropriate to establish at the outset that other 
variables do have such an effect. The two tasks which have been most 
frequently used as measures of lexical access time, for example, are lexical 
decisions (in which subjects make a w ord-nonw ord judgement on a string of 
letters presented in isolation) and phoneme-monitoring (in which subjects 
listen within sentences for a word beginning with a specified sound). For the 
former, Whaley (1978) has presented a comprehensive review of the relative 
effects of a number of variables on lexical decision time; frequency of 
occurrence, meaningfulness, word length, and several other factors exert 
strong effects on response time in this task. For the latter, both Cutler and 
Norris (1979) and Foss and Blank (1980) have argued strongly that 
phoneme-monitoring response time can provide a measure of the time 
required to understand the word which precedes the target-bearing word in 
the sentence1; Foss and Blank show, for instance, that phoneme-monitoring 
responses are sensitive both to frequency of occurrence and w ord-nonw ord  
status of the word preceding the target-bearing item. In the following sections 
it will be seen that measures of lexical access time consistently fail to show 
effects of lexical complexity; but the reliable effects of frequency and other 
factors demonstrate that this failure simply is not due to the lack of a suitable 
metric by which to assess variations in lexical access time.
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SEM ANTIC COM PLEXITY
Semantic complexity covers a fairly wide range of variations between words. 
Firstly, there is lexical ambiguity, cited above as an example of semantic
complexity; but ambiguity itself is not a unitary phenomenon. It includes: (a) 
unsystematic ambiguity, i.e. words with multiple quite unrelated senses 
(bear); (b) systematic ambiguity, i.e. words with related senses in different 
categories (glue); but also (c) words with closely related senses which 
nevertheless have quite distinct referents (e.g. run of people, water, or roads). 
Secondly, the meanings of words contain information of more central and less 
central nature; thus the most important part of the definition of the words 
beer and brandy is that they each describe a kind of alcoholic drink; but in the
sentence T h is  container holds the equivalent of a bottle o f ------ ’, they call up
our knowledge that beer comes (in civilised countries at least) in small bottles 
and brandy in large ones; while ‘He drank brandy in everyone else’s round 
but beer in his own 1 appeals to our stored knowledge that brandy is a 
comparatively expensive drink, beer a relatively cheap one.
Certain words carry implications about their surrounding sentence context 
as part of their intrinsic meaning. Selection restrictions work this way: only 
horses can be piebald , only round things can roll. Factive verbs imply, 
similarly, the truth of their complements: ‘I regret that Australian beer bottles 
hold 26 fluid ounces’ is factive; ‘I think that Australian beer bottles hold 26 
fluid ounces’ is not. Finally, the negative element of otherwise unmarked 
negative words such as doubt or reluctant, or the causative element in verbs 
such as kill or dye, could be held to make the semantic representations of such 
words more complex than those of words which are neither negative nor 
causative.
Again it should be made quite clear that disparate phenomena are being 
treated as if they were alike. Having more than one meaning, as ambiguous 
words do, is not at all the same thing as having, say, a meaning which can only 
be conjoined with a very few other concepts, as is the case with the meaning 
of piebald. But selection restrictions, factive presuppositions and negative 
implications are indisputable components of the meaning of words, with clear 
distributional and syntactic consequences, just as ambiguity is indisputable. 
The evidence to be cited in this section will show that the processing of a word 
necessarily involves access of whatever such indisputable information is 
associated with it in the lexicon. In this the different varieties of semantic 
complexity are alike. The case of causativity, however, involves lexical 
structure which is not indisputable but highly contentious; and, indeed, the 
review of the evidence on this issue will suggest that there is no validity to the 
claim that semantic decomposition is a lexical reality analogous to the other 
types of semantic complexity.
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Lexical ambiguity
This is one of the most heavily investigated topics in psycholinguistics. There 
is good evidence, particularly from quite recent research, that multiple 
meanings of a lexically ambiguous word are stored together in the lexicon. 
The evidence is provided by studies which show that occurrence of an 
ambiguous word makes both its relevant and its irrelevant senses 
momentarily available, even if sentence context makes it quite clear which 
sense is appropriate. Swinney (1979) presented listeners with sentences 
containing an ambiguous word, and required them to make a word-nonword 
decision about a string of letters presented visually exactly at the point at 
which the ambiguous word occurred in the auditory channel. The letter
strings might be nonwords, words unrelated in meaning to the ambiguous 
word, or words related to one or the other meaning. For example, a sentence
might contain the ambiguous word bug , with the visually presented words 
being ant, spy or sew. Both the related words (ant and spy) were responded to 
faster than the unrelated word (sew) even when the context resolved the 
ambiguity; Swinney argued that both meanings of the ambiguous word must 
have been activated since associates of both meanings have been primed. 
Similarly, Lackner and Garrett (1972) presented listeners dichotically with 
two competing messages, one of which was a sentence to which the listeners 
were required to attend and which they had to paraphrase immediately after 
hearing it. Some of the sentences contained ambiguous words. In the 
unattended channel other material was presented (which subjects could not 
later report), and this material resolved the ambiguity. Lackner and Garrett 
found that subjects’ paraphrases reflected the particular sense expressed by 
the disambiguating unattended message, and argued that since either 
meaning could be chosen according to which biasing context was presented, 
both meanings of the lexically ambiguous word must have been momentarily 
accessed from the lexicon. Finally, an experiment by Conrad (1974) required 
subjects to name the colour of the ink of printed words, some of which 
expressed meaning related to the ambiguous word which had occurred in a 
previously heard sentence; colour naming time was longer for words related 
to either meaning of the ambiguous word than to unrelated words.
Thus there is a good deal of support for the contention that accessing a 
lexically ambiguous word involves accessing all its senses. There is no 
evidence, however, that accessing a word with more than one sense incurs 
greater processing cost than accessing a word with a single sense. 
Phoneme-monitoring studies which claimed to demonstrate an increase in 
processing load associated with the occurrence of a lexical ambiguity (Foss, 
1970; Foss and Jenkins, 1973; Cairns and Kamerman, 1975) appear to have 
confounded the ambiguity variable with physical differences between 
ambiguous words and their unambiguous controls (Mehler, Segui, and Carey,
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1978; Newman and Dell, 1978); when these factors are controlled, sentences 
containing lexical ambiguities produce phoneme-monitoring reaction times 
no longer than those for matched unambiguous control sentences (Newman 
and Dell, 1978; Norris, 1980), and manipulation of the physical factors can 
make sentences containing an ambiguous word produce shorter reaction times 
than their controls (Mehler, Segui, and Carey, 1978).
The currently available evidence therefore suggests that lexical ambiguity is 
not associated with an increase in the difficulty of lexical access. It should be 
noted, however, that judging a string of words to be an acceptable sentence is 
more difficult if the sentence contains an ambiguous word than if it does not 
(Mistler-Lachman, 1975; Holmes, Arwas, and Garrett, 1977). Similarly, if a 
subject is required to comprehend time-compressed sentences presented at a 
very rapid rate and also to recall a list of words presented after each sentence, 
then fewer words from the list are recalled correctly when the sentence 
contains a lexical ambiguity than when it does not (Chodorow, 1979). These 
results perhaps reflect the development of an interpretation of the sentence as 
a whole. That is to say, although tasks which specifically measure lexical 
access difficulty show that ambiguous words are no harder to access than 
unambiguous words, it may well be the case that it is more difficult to 
construct a semantic representation of the sentence as a whole when the 
sentence contains an ambiguous word, and it is thus more difficult to integrate 
the sentence into actual or potential context. A similar suggestion has recently 
been put forward by Onifer and Swinney (1981) to account for the effects of 
frequency of meaning. It has been claimed (Hogaboam and Perfetti, 1975; 
Holmes, 1979) that the various senses of an ambiguous word are accessed in 
order of their frequency (i.e. the ‘blow’ reading of punch  before the ‘drink’ 
reading) and that access of more than one sense only occcurs when a less 
frequent sense is required. However, Onifer and Swinney showed that 
priming of words related to both senses of a lexically ambiguous word occurs 
even when the context demands the most frequent reading; they argued that 
the apparent effects of frequency of meaning reflected a kpost-access decision 
process'. If the lengthened acceptability judgement times which 
Mistler-Lachman and Holmes et cil. found for sentences containing an 
ambiguity indeed reflect difficulty of integrating the ambiguous word into 
sentence context, then it is reasonable to expect that there should be less 
difficulty in the sentence acceptability judgement tasks when the sentence 
expresses the more frequently used meaning of the ambiguous word than 
when it embodies the less frequently used meaning. Exactly this was found to 
be the case by Holmes (1979). Similarly when a word is used in its most 
frequent sense, and is therefore easily integrated into its context, it may be 
difficult to make judgements upon it with relation to other contexts, for 
example to decide whether or not it is ambiguous. This is what Hogaboam 
and Perfetti (1975) found.
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The processing of semantically complex words in sentence context will be 
discussed again below. With regard to lexical access alone, the ambiguity 
studies strongly indicate that all senses of an ambiguous word are accessed but 
that lexical access itself is no more difficult for ambiguous than for 
unambiguous words. Lexical ambiguity thus offers a standard against which 
other types of semantic complexity, on which there is much less evidence 
available, can be compared.
Factivity
A predicate is said to be factive when it implies that its sentence complement 
expresses a true proposition. Factivity is thus an instance of lexical presupposi­
tion (see Morgan, 1969, on the distinction between lexical and sentential 
presupposition). There exists a whole class of factive words (Kiparsky and 
Kiparsky, 1971) comprising verbs such as regret and know , and adjectives 
such as important and crazy (cf. ‘Bruce thought the decision crazy’ versus 
‘Bruce thought the decision likely’). It is reasonable to assume that lexical 
presupposition in general, and factivity in particular, is an inseparable part of 
the definition of such words (the Concise Oxford Dictionary, for example, 
defines regret as ‘be distressed about or sorry for (event, fact)’). Hence it 
should be incorporated in the mental representation of a factive verb or 
adjective, and when such a word occurs in a sentence, retrieval of its meaning 
from the internal lexicon should include retrieval of its presuppositional 
implications with respect to its complement. It thus becomes legitimate to 
query whether the occurrence of a factive is associated with greater processing 
difficulty as a result of the implications it involves, in comparison with 
otherwise similar but non-factive words. No existing evidence on this question 
is available in the literature; the data below come from studies of my own.
Again, it appears that lexical complexity does not imply difficulty. In a 
phoneme-monitoring experiment run by David Swinney and myself in 
Swinney’s laboratory at Tufts University, response time was compared to
target sounds preceded (a) by factive verbs or adjectives, or (b) by non-factive 
control words matched with the factives on frequency and length in syllables. 
An example sentence is:
(1) The retired general deplored/declared a continued readiness for war 
on the part of the N A TO  partners.
In this example the target sound is /k /  and the target-bearing word 
therefore ‘continued’. The factive words produced reaction times not 
significantly different from those produced by the non-factives (see Table
2.1), (F j( l ;3 0 )  = 1.25, p  >  .25).
Thus lexical access of a factive word seems to involve no greater processing 
difficulty than access of a non-factive. In contrast to the ambiguity case,
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Table 2.1 Phoneme monitoring latencies 
(msec) to target words preceded by a factive 
or a non-factive verb or  adjective
Average latencies
Factive Non-factive
515 506
however, factivity also exhibits no effect on the time required to judge 
whether or not a sentence is acceptable. In a follow-up to the previous 
experiment, conducted at Sussex University, I used the same set of factive 
words in a sentence classification experiment; again each sentence occurred in 
two versions, one containing the factive and another a non-factive verb or 
adjective matched on frequency and length in letters, for example:
(2) The retired general deplored/declared the army’s readiness for war.
The response time to classify the sentences as acceptable or not did not differ 
significantly across the two conditions (Table 2.2) <  1).
Thus factivity, unlike ambiguity, does not appear to be associated with any 
difficulty of integration into an overall representation of the sentence. Factive 
verbs and adjectives are as easy to process at all levels as non-factive verbs 
and adjectives.
Table 2.2 Time (msec) required to classify 
sentences containing factive versus non-factive
verbs or  adjectives
Average classification time
Factive Non-factive
•
2068 2064
Selection restrictions
Many verbs and adjectives are severely constrained with respect to the nouns 
of which they are predicated. Only liquids can spray , for example, or be 
lukewarm , whereas only adult females can be pregnant. When such words are 
applied to nouns not meeting the relevant restrictions (‘pregnant silence’, ‘a 
lukewarm reception’) they are understood to be used metaphorically, i.e. the 
restrictions are observed in the breach.
Selection restrictions of this kind must form part of the restricted word’s
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lexical entry. (Again we can call on the testimony of printed dictionaries, 
which commonly state the selection restrictions at the outset of a definition: 
‘of liquids’; ‘of a woman or a female aninal’; etc.) Thus the lexical entry for a 
word which involves selection restrictions is more complex than for one which 
does not, in that accessing the word will automatically produce the 
information that the set of nouns of which it can be predicated is severely 
limited. Is a restrictive lexical representation more difficult to process at any 
level than a non-restrictive one?
Once more, the answer is no. In fact, the reverse is true: words embodying 
selection restrictions can be very efficient at selecting a set of appropriate 
associates, and the consequent priming between words can result in sentences 
containing restrictive verbs or adjectives being easier to process than 
sentences with similar but non-restrictive words. Again the evidence is 
provided by unpublished work from the University of Sussex laboratory. 
Norris (1980) compared sentences like (3a), in which the verb embodies 
selection restrictions, with sentences like (3b), containing a non-restrictive 
verb, in a sentence classification task.
(3) a. The ink sprayed the customer, b. The ink annoyed the customer.
Norris found that the acceptability judgement times were shorter for the 
restrictive-verb versions. That is, construction of an overall sentence 
representation appears to be easier when the sentence contains a restrictive 
rather than a non-restrictive verb. This implies that retrieval of words from 
the mental lexicon does include retrieval of any selection restrictions 
associated with them; but the extra complexity of the information retrieved 
does not mean that linguistic processing becomes harder as a result.
Lexical negatives
Negation increases response time in a large number of psycholinguistic tasks 
(Wason, 1959, 1961; Just and Carpenter, 1971; Chase and Clark, 1972). 
Single lexical items can be in themselves negative— for instance, when they 
have a negating prefix (unhappy , dislike), or when they imply a negative 
(doubt = not believe; vacant = not occupied). The syntactic behaviour of 
affixed and implicit negatives is in many cases exactly like that of explicit 
negative elements (Klima, 1964). One must ask therefore whether negative 
lexical items are by themselves associated with an increase in processing 
difficulty, since they would seem to constitute an outstanding instance of 
lexical complexity which is likely to imply processing complexity.
Indeed, Clark and Clark (1977) have reported that the familiar response 
time deficit assocated with negation also appears when implicit negatives are 
used in a verification task (in which subjects judge whether or not a sentence 
accurately describes the content of a visual display, whether a sentence is true
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or false, or whether or not two sentences have the same meaning). A series of 
experiments by Sherman (1973, 1976) has investigated the contribution of 
explicit, implicit, and affixal negatives to reaction time to judge the 
‘reasonableness’ of a proposition. He found that all types of negative 
elements, including lexical negatives, led to an increase in time to make the 
decision, in comparison with latency to judge the reasonableness of a 
sentence which contained no negative elements.
None of these tasks, however, measured direct lexical access or even 
sentence comprehension time. All of them required the subject to make a 
judgement about the content of the sentences presented— truth, 
reasonableness, accuracy in describing a picture, or identity with another 
sentence’s content. Thus the effect of negation on response time might apply 
to any of several components of the subject’s task: comparison or verification 
time as well as comprehension time. It does not necessarily follow from these 
results that affixed or implicit negatives are more difficult to access from the 
mental lexicon than non-negative words, or that sentences containing affixed 
or implicit negatives are more difficult to comprehend than sentences without 
any such words.
Again the only specific investigations of lexical access and sentence 
processing time with this variable are unpublished studies from the University 
of Sussex laboratory. The evidence indicates that negative lexical items, like 
other semantically complex words, are no more difficult to process than 
comparable simple words. In a phoneme-monitoring study, I measured 
reaction time to targets preceded by afffixed or implicitly negative verbs or 
adjectives in comparison with non-negatives matched on frequency and 
length in syllables, as in (4) and (5), in both of which the target sound is / b / :
(4) The recommendations of the environmental impact study were sure 
to disappoint/gratify backers of the new development.
(5) The dog sniffing round the yard stuck its nose into the empty/yellow 
bucket under the hedge.
As can be seen from Table 2.3, the effect of negation was not significant
Table 2.3 Phoneme monitoring latencies (msec) to target words 
preceded by implicit and affixed negative and non-negative verbs
and adjectives
Average latencies
Negative Control Average
Implicit 434 417 423
Affixed 436 447 441
Average 435 432
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Table 2.4 Lexical decision latencies (msec) to implicit and 
affixed negative and non-negative verbs and adjectives
Average latencies
Negative Control Average
Implicit 635 659 647
Affixed 708 710 709
Average 672 684
( f ,  <  1). Since no attempt was made to match across the two sets of negative 
words, no estimate of the comparative difficulty of affixed and implicit 
negatives can be made on the basis of these data.
The same negative words were also included in a simple visual lexical 
decision (word-nonword) experiment, along with three sets of control words: 
one set matched with the negatives on length in letters and frequency; 
another set matched on length but not on frequency; and a third set matched 
on frequency but not on length. Although both the length (7^(3,57) =  4.23, 
p  <  0.01) and frequency (/71(3,57) = 15.95, p  <  0.001) manipulations 
produced the predicted significant effects, there was no significant effect of 
negation ( /71(1,19) =  1.71, p > 0.2) as Table 2.4 shows.
Thus it is clear that lexical access per se takes no more time for a negative 
than for a non-negative word. Nor, it appears, is the process of simply 
understanding a sentence containing a lexical negative difficult in itself. The 
same 24 negative words used in the preceding two experiments were also 
incorporated in a sentence classification experiment in which subjects were 
asked to judge the acceptability of sentences containing either one of the 
negative words or a non-negative word matched on frequency and length in 
letters, for example:
(6) The headmaster will forbid/compel the boys to stay at school.
(7) The conservative vicar disliked/approved the choice of hymns.
Response time did not vary significantly as a function of the presence or
Table 2.5 Classification times (msec) for sentences containing 
implicit and affixed negative and non-negative verbs and adjectives
Average classification times
Negative Control Average
Implicit 1912 1983 1947
Affixed 2114 2088 2 1 0 2
Average 2013 2035
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absence of a lexical negative, as is clear from Table 2.5, (771(1,26) = 2.05, 
p > 0.15).
We can summarize the evidence on lexical negation as follows: the fact that 
implicit and affixed negatives behave like explicit negative elements in 
verification tasks argues strongly that the processing of such lexical negatives 
involves processing of the negative element. That is, it is apparent that part of 
the lexical representation of an affixed or implicit negative is a representation 
of negation. Nonetheless, no reflection of additional processing complexity as 
a result of the presence of a single negative element shows up in tasks which 
measure lexical access or sentence comprehension time. From this we are 
forced to conclude that the response time decrement associated with single
negative lexical items in verification tasks must result from other requirements 
of the task than sentence comprehension per se. Lexical negatives, like other 
semantically complex words, contain additional information (a negative 
element) in their lexical entry, but are not by virtue of this more difficult to 
understand.
However, although a sentence containing a single negative item is no more 
difficult to understand than an all-affirmative sentence, it is well known that 
as the number of negatives in a sentence increases, the sentence rapidly 
becomes extremely hard to interpret:
( 8) Few Australians would fail to deny their reluctance not to doubt that 
the Tasmanian devil no longer exists.
But again, this effect appears to operate on the construction of a semantic 
representation of the sentence as a whole. Conceivably, construction of an 
overall sentence representation involves setting a truth index (one model 
incorporating such an index is given by Clark and Clark, 1977), and each
additional occurrence of a negative item would require that the truth index be 
reset. If it were the case that this setting and resetting process is hard to keep 
track of, then competing representations of the sentence might become 
simultaneously available, leading to difficulty in deciding upon a final 
interpretation. In any case, it is clear that the difficulty associated with the 
occurrence of negation in sentences like ( 8) inheres in the construction of an 
integrated sentence representation; the experiments on single lexical 
negatives demonstrate convincingly that it is not a lexical access effect.
Semantic decomposition
Some linguists, Lakoff (1965), for example, or Postal (1970), have argued 
that the lexical representations of several classes of single words are expressed 
in terms of the meaning of other words or phrases, specifically, concepts 
corresponding to components of their semantic representation. Thus 
causative verbs such as kill or dye might be expressed as C A U SE (die) or
54 T H E  P R O C E S S  O F  L A N G U A G E  U N D E R S T A N D I N G
CAUSE (acquire colour). More generally, word meanings might be defined 
in terms of superordinate concepts, e.g. man as (adult) (male) (human) 
(animate), etc.
A good deal of controversy has surrounded this claim, both in linguistics 
and in psycholinguistics. It is discussed here because it makes clear 
predictions about added complexity resulting from the lexical access of, for 
instance, causative verbs. That is, if the correct semantic analysis of a sentence 
such as ‘the dingo killed the wombat’ is a structure containing two 
propositions, one with an explicit verb of causation and the other with an 
inchoative (unanalysed) verb, i.e. ‘The dingo caused (the wombat die)’, then a 
listener’s comprehension of this superficially single-proposition sentence must 
involve reconstruction of the two-proposition underlying representation and 
must therefore involve greater perceptual complexity than comprehension of 
a sentence not containing a causative. But a number of experiments, mainly 
by Kintsch (1974), have failed to show any effect on processing difficulty of 
semantic complexity of this kind. For instance, Kintsch found that causative 
verbs were not associated with any increase in difficulty in comparison with 
inchoative verbs when processing difficulty was measured by sentence 
initiation time, sentence completion time, or phoneme-monitoring response 
latency. Similarly, unpublished experiments in our laboratory at Sussex have 
failed to find an effect of semantic complexity of verbs on (a) time to read a 
sentence, (b) latency to answer a question, and (c) lexical decision response 
time, i.e. lexical access time.
This is not more than the previous catalogue of findings on multiple 
meanings, presuppositions, selection restrictions, and negative marking would 
have led us to expect; all of these types of information are incorporated in 
lexical representations, are activated in the course of lexical access, but do not 
lead to an increase in processing difficulty. Yet there are strong reasons for 
believing that semantic decomposition is a very different case from the other 
four kinds of semantic complexity discussed above: to wit, there is no
evidence that the lexical representations of, say, causative verbs are in fact 
decomposed, and there is even a certain amount of evidence that they are not 
decomposed. Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes (1980), for instance, 
conducted a series of experiments in which they elicited subjects’ judgements 
of how closely related were two words within a sentence. This test proved 
sensitive to differences in underlying structure, for instance between
sentences with expect-type verbs and persuade-type verbs. Thus, in (9) the 
underlying structure of the expect version has the two words, ‘captain’ and 
‘passengers’, in different clauses (9'), whereas in the persuade version both 
words occur in the main clause (9").
(9) The captain expected/persuaded the passengers to stay calm.
(9') The captain expected (the passengers stay calm).
(9") The captain persuaded the passengers (the passengers stay calm).
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As predicted, the words ‘captain’ and ‘passengers’ were judged significantly
more related in the persuade version than in the expect version of (9).
However, no corresponding differences were found between the relatedness
judgements for ‘workers’ and ‘paint’ in a comparison of causative verbs with 
matched non-causatives, as in ( 1 0 ):
(10) The workers spilled/found some paint.
although if the causative verb had been decomposed in comprehension, the 
underlying structure of the causative sentence would presumably have 
contained the two tested words in different underlying clauses:
(10') The workers caused (paint spill).
Similarly, Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett (1975) found standard performance 
decrement effects of negative marking in affixed and implicit negatives in a 
verification task similar to that used by Sherman (1973), but found no such 
effects for words whose decomposed definitions should contain a negative 
element, e.g. bachelor. Fodor et al. concluded that since these words do not 
act as though they contain a negative element in their semantic 
representation, they are presumably not decomposed into simpler elements in 
the process of being understood.
Kintsch (1974) found that words with decomposable definitions did not 
produce more errors than matched inchoative words on a simple memory 
task, although in prior research (Kintsch, 1972) he had found evidence that 
other kinds of lexical complexity (see the discussion of morphological 
complexity in the following section) were associated with poorer memory task 
performance. In another experiment, Kintsch used sentences containing 
decomposable words (e.g. convince) in a recall task and found that words 
representing a base component of the meaning of the experimental words (in 
this instance believe) were effective recall cues— as effective as high associates 
(e.g. persuade) though not as effective as the complex word itself. (None of 
the components were themselves high associates of the experimental words; 
but note that Fischler, 1977, has shown that any semantically related word 
will prime as efficiently as a high associate). Thus definitional elements of the 
decomposable word’s meaning are effective primes for that word, but the 
processing (understanding and memory storage) of a decomposable word 
does not necessarily involve decomposition into its components; if it did, one 
might have expected Kintsch’s component words to have provided as 
effective a recall cue as the complex words themselves.
The evidence seems clear: semantic decomposition, like other forms of 
semantic complexity, is not associated with added processing difficulty. In 
fact, it appears that it may not even be analogous to other kinds of semantic 
complexity discussed above, since not even an indirect reflection of 
decomposition in sentence comprehension has been found. Decomposable
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words such as kill, bachelor , or convince  may have lexical representations
which overlap enough with those of other words to evoke these other words as 
associates; but there is no evidence that the component concepts are actually 
contained in the definition of complex words. Certainly the strongest possible 
version of the decomposition hypothesis is not valid— decomposable words 
are not accessed via the lexical representation of other words corresponding 
to components of their semantic representation. And like other semantically 
complex words, words with decomposable definitions are not more difficult to 
access from the lexicon than words with simpler definitions.
M O R P H O L O G IC A L  CO M PLEX ITY
Morphological complexity has not always been considered as an issue 
separate from semantic complexity. In the same way that the lexical 
representation of kill  was hypothesized to be constructed from the lexical 
representation of cause  and die, so for instance the lexical form of a derived 
word such as wisdom  was hypothesized to be constructed from that of its base 
word, in this case wise. It should be noted that all of Kintsch’s experiments 
described in the previous section examined morphologically complex words 
(abstract and agent nouns such as ability  and speaker)  as well as causatives 
and other decomposable words; the results reported did not differ 
significantly across type of word. But the two cases have been separated in 
this discussion for a good reason, namely that whereas there is no evidence 
that decomposable words contain within their lexical entry a representation of
the base words which supposedly comprise their meaning, there is abundant 
evidence that morphologically complex words do contain within their lexical 
representation the details of their morphological structure.
Prefixed words
This topic has attracted a number of recent studies: Taft and Forster (1975); 
Taft (1979); Stanners, Neiser, and Painton (1979); Fay (in press); Rubin, 
Becker, and Freeman (1979). Taft and Forster’s study investigated the time to 
reject nonwords in a lexical decision tasks as a function of whether or not the 
nonwords were stems of existent prefixed words: e .g .juvenate  from rejuvenate  
was compared with pertoire  from repertoire , which is not prefixed. The 
juvenate  type of nonwords took significantly longer to reject than the pertoire  
type. This response time difference also held when the items were presented 
bearing pseudoprefixes (dejuvenate  versus depertoire). Taft and Forster 
argued that prefixed words are stored in the lexicon under a heading which 
corresponds to their stem, that is, rejuvenate  is actually stored as juvenate. In 
direct support of this conclusion they reported another experiment in which
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they examined real words which occurred also as stems. In some cases the 
prefixed form was much more common than the stand-alone form (as is the 
case with prevent  versus vent), in others the prefixed form was less common 
than the stand-alone form (e.g .card  versus discard). Lexical decision reaction 
time to words like vent was slower than reaction time to words which only 
occurred alone; but this was not the case for words like ca rd . Taft and 
Forster’s explanation of this finding involved interference from the 
higher-frequency forms which could not stand alone and on which a ‘yes’ 
response could therefore not be based. This particular result, however, is 
highly likely to be artefactual. The stand-alone roots were matched with their 
controls on frequency of the surface form alone, not including the frequencies 
of other regular inflected forms. In this experiment 16 of the 20 vent-type 
words were matched with controls which had a much higher frequency when 
other inflections are taken into account. Pending  and p ic k in g , for instance, 
have a surface frequency of 14 each, but the combined frequency of p ick  plus 
p icked  plus p ick ing  plus picks  is 151, whereas the combined frequency of all 
forms of p en d  is still 14 (Kucera and Francis, 1967). This fact alone could 
have accounted for the reaction time difference found in this condition; in the 
card  condition, where no reaction time difference was found, there was also 
no imbalance between roots and controls on the combined frequency 
measure. (As will be seen in the following section, the evidence is very clear 
that regular inflections for tense and number do not produce separate lexical 
representations for each form. It is therefore very important to take this fact 
into account when constructing frequency-matched materials).
Taft (1979) reported a further experiment in which pairs of words were 
compared which themselves had the same frequency of occurrence (e.g.
reproach  and dissuade)  but differed in the frequency of occurrence of their 
same-stem relatives (approach  is more frequent than persuade).  In each case 
the relatives were higher in frequency than the stimulus words (though higher 
by different amounts) so that the interference effects as claimed in the Taft 
and Forster experiment should have been equivalent in this case. The words 
with comparatively high-frequency same-stem relatives were responded to 
significantly faster than their frequency-matched controls with comparatively 
low-frequency relatives. Thus the reaction time advantage of a 
high-frequency word can carry over to its morphological relatives, indicating 
that, according to Taft, the lexical representations of morphologically related 
words are closely connected with the frequency rating for the entire group 
determined most probably by the aggregate of all the related forms.
Stem defined lexical representation is also postulated by Fay (in press) on 
the basis of a study of prefix errors in spontaneous speech. Substitution errors 
often occur in which a prefixed word is replaced by another word with the 
same stem but different prefix ( 1 1 ), or by a non-occurring combination of
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prefix with the target stem ( 1 2 ):
(11) . . .  the sewing constructions  (Intended: instructions)
(12) . . .  to which I would like to become concustom ed  (Intended: 
accustom ed).
Fay argued that these errors are best explained in terms of a model of the 
mental lexicon in which prefixed words are accessed via their stems; in the 
production case, the correct stem is accessed but the wrong prefix attached to 
it, resulting in a typical prefix error.
However, there are two recent pieces of evidence which indicate that it may 
not be the case that the lexical representation of a prefixed word is simply and 
only in terms of its stem. Stanners, Neiser, and Painton (1979) used the 
repetition priming effect (the reaction time to the second presentation of a 
particular word in a list of lexical decision items is speeded; Forbach, 
Stanners, and Hochhaus, 1974) to investigate the effectiveness of 
morphological components as primes for a morphologically complex word. 
They found that stem and prefix presented separately (either alone, or as part 
of other words) earlier in the list significantly facilitated lexical decision 
response time to a later representation of a prefixed word in comparison with 
the same word presented without preceding primes. However, they also found 
that priming with the word itself was significantly more effective than priming 
with its morphological components presented separately. They argued that 
the model of the lexicon best supported by their results was one in which each 
prefixed word had a unitary undecomposed representation— so that the word 
itself was its own best prime— but the representations of all words with the 
same stem were connected, perhaps via a representation of the stem, so that 
accessing any one activated, to some extent, the others; thus the 
morphological components were also effective primes. In another experiment 
Stanners et al. found that words with independently meaningful prefixes (e.g. 
un-, de-)  were as effective at priming their stem words as the stem words 
themselves; that is, unaware  was as good a prime for aware  as aware  itself.
A similar conclusion to that drawn by Stanners et al. was suggested by 
Rubin, Becker, and Freeman (1979). Lexical decision reaction times were 
found by Rubin et al. to be faster for prefixed words (rem ark)  than for 
pseudo-prefixed words (reckon)  when the rest of the list consisted of prefixed 
words and ‘prefixed’ nonv/ords (retext), but not when the rest of the list 
consisted of non-prefixed words and nonwords. More recently, Taft (1981) 
found a nam ing  reaction time deficit for pseudoprefixed words, even when 
subjects saw no really prefixed words at all; but Henderson, Wallis and 
Knight (1983) failed to find any lexical decision  reaction time deficit for 
pseudoprefixed words in a mixed list. Rubin et al. proposed morphological 
decomposition of a prefixed word in lexical access as an optional 
strategy— not necessary, since prefixed words have a unitary representation,
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but possible, since they can be accessed via their stem. For this mode of access 
to be at all possible the morphological structure information must be 
incorporated in the lexical representation; either all words with one stem are 
listed conjointly, with access to the stem activating them all, or prefixed words 
have two unconnected representations, one unitary and one headed by the 
stem. The former alternative is the one most compatible with the Stanners 
et al. results as well as with those of Taft, of Fay, and of Rubin et al.
Finally, another experiment by Fay (1980) supports this kind of mixed
model. In a lexical decision experiment, prefixed words (institute) did not 
differ in response time from non-prefixed words (assassin) , but prefixed 
nonwords composed of nonexistent combinations of real stems and prefixes 
(abvention)  were significantly more difficult to reject than non-prefixed 
nonwords. Fay interpreted this finding as indicating that prefixed words could 
be accessed holistically, but that access via the stem was also possible; this 
latter option was responsible for the interference effect with nonwords, as the 
entry for vention  would have to be checked out to ensure that it could not 
occur with ab-. Taft, Forster, and Garrett (1974, cited by Taft and Forster, 
1975) also found that, o ther things being equal, prefixed words are no more 
difficult to access from the lexicon than non-prefixed words. The results 
reported in the section on Lexical negatives  above also include a parallel 
finding: in our studies of negation, words with negative prefix were no more 
difficult to process than non-prefixed controls. That is to say, whatever 
activation of morphological structure goes on in the recognition of a prefixed 
word, it does not make the process of recognition more difficult.
Suffixed words
In flections
There is abundant evidence that words inflected for tense or number do not 
have lexical representation independent of their base form, and that base 
word and inflection are separated in language processing. In tachistoscopic 
presentation inflected words seem to be perceived as two units (Gibson and 
Guinet, 1971). Recall of adverbs ending in -ly is affected by the frequency of 
the base adjective rather than the frequency of the inflected adverb form 
(Rosenberg, Coyle, and Porter, 1966). Regular inflected forms (pours) show 
a repetition priming effect on their base words (pour) as strong as that of the 
base word itself (Stanners, Neiser, Hernon & Hall 1979; Fowler & Napps 
1982), while priming with irregular inflected forms (hung)  is less effective 
than priming with the base word itself (hang)  though still significantly better 
than no prime at all (Stanners, Neiser, Hernon, and Hall, 1979). This kind of 
morphological priming is, also, somewhat more robust over time than 
semantic priming (Henderson, Wallis & Knight, 1983). Pretraining with an
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inflectional variant (e.g. sees) significantly facilitates later learning of a word 
(e.g. seen) in comparison with no pretraining, or pretraining with a word with 
as much visual similarity to the target word as the morphological relative (e.g. 
seed ; Murrell and Morton, 1974). Only regular inflections provide effective 
priming, however, when the dependent variable is accuracy of report of a 
degraded auditory signal (Kempley and Morton, 1982). Plural morphemes tend 
to get detached in memory representations (van der Molen and Morton,
1979). Lexical decision reaction times are sensitive both to the frequency of 
occurrence of the surface form and to the combined frequency of base plus 
inflectional variants (Taft, 1979). Neither lexical decision reaction times nor 
word naming times, however, are affected simply by whether or not a word 
embodies an inflection (Fowler and Napps, 1982).
An argument in favour of a stemorganized lexicon has been advanced by
Jarvella and Meijers (Chapter 3 of this volume). Jarvella and Meijers primed 
target verbs either with differently inflected forms of the same stem, or with 
similarly inflected forms of different stems; subjects in their experiments 
performed same and different stem judgements significantly faster than 
inflection judgements, a result which they interpreted as evidence against the 
independent lexical representation of inflected forms.
Similarly, it has been claimed that inflected forms are actually generated by 
rule during speech production. This argument has chiefly been made on 
speech error evidence (Fromkin, 1973; Garrett, 1976; MacKay, 1979); 
errors in which inflections are misplaced in an utterance are common, and the 
inflectional form applied in the error is usually that appropriate to the word to 
which it has actually been attached rather than to the word to which it was 
intended to be attached:
(13) I’d hear one if I knew it. (Intended: I'd know one if I heard it.)
(14) . . .  in little yellow bag from the banks(s). (Intended: bags(z) from 
the bank.)
MacKay (1976) has made the same claim on the basis of his experimental 
finding that translating a present into a past tense form takes longer and is 
more subject to error the more complex the relation between base and 
inflected form. The evidence is, however, also quite compatible with 
representation of the appropriate inflected forms in the lexicon: not as 
independent, unitary entries, but as a sub-part of the lexical entry for the base 
word. Such a representation would have to allow for differential degrees of 
closeness between base and inflection, to account for the lesser effectiveness 
of irregular forms as primes in comparison with regular forms (Stanners, 
Neiser, Hernon, and Hall, 1979) and greater difficulty of translation from one 
to the other (MacKay, 1976); it would also account for the finding of Jarvella 
and Snodgrass (1974) that reaction time to judge that the same base word was 
involved in a pair of words (base -I- inflected form) was longer when the
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inflection was irregular (sing-sang) than when it was regular (sail-sailed) . 
Finally, a recent experiment by Lukatela, Gligorijevic, Kostic, and Turvey
(1980) investigated noun inflections in Serbo-Croatian; from the fact that lexi­
cal decision responses to nominative forms were consistently faster than 
responses to genitive or instrumental forms, the authors argued for a model of 
lexical representation of inflected forms in which the nominative comprises 
the nucleus of a cluster of separate entries, one for each form.
Derivational suffixes
As was mentioned above, Kintsch (1974) failed to find on-line processing 
effects of the derivational complexity of agent and abstract nouns. Two 
studies, it is true, do report a reaction time deficit associated with 
morphological complexity, but in each case there is reason to believe that the 
result may have been due to other factors. Snodgrass and Jarvella (1972) 
found lexical decision reaction time to be longer to prefixed and suffixed 
forms in comparison with their base forms; but the comparison strings were 
matched neither on frequency nor on length. Holyoak, Glass, and Mah 
(1976) found that reaction time to judge whether or not a string of words 
expressed a true proposition (a task which, it will be recalled, was found by 
Sherman, 1973, to be sensitive to lexical negation) was longer when a 
morphologically complex word was involved, e.g. ‘knights have strength’ 
versus ‘knights are strong’. Flowever, since the effect persisted (for some 
items) even when the predicate was presented (and processed) before the 
sentence subject, Flolyoak et al. claimed that it constituted evidence against 
morphological decomposition; and indeed, since the authors had failed to 
control for length, frequency or syntactic structure, there is no lack of 
alternative explanations for their results. Similarly open to criticism is the 
finding of Kintsch (1972) that derived nouns produce poorer performance in 
a paired-associate learning task; when the additional variable of concreteness 
was controlled, the effect disappeared (Richardson, 1975). In fact, such 
factors as concreteness and imageability seem to have been confounded with 
morphological complexity in a num ber of o ther early studies of this topic; see 
Richardson (1977) for a review.
Thus, not suprisingly in view of all the evidence summarized hereto, there is 
no indication that suffixed words are more difficult to process than matched 
simple words. But there is evidence that morphological structure of this kind 
is represented in the lexicon. Kintsch (1974) found that base components of 
abstract and agent nouns such as ability  and attendant (able, attend)  were as 
effective recall cues as high associates of the same words (skill, gas station). 
Stanners, Neiser, Hernon, and Hall (1979; replicated by Fowler & Napps 
1982) found that derived words (selective, destruction)  produced a significant 
repetition priming effect for their base words (select, des troy ), though not as
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large an effect as that produced by the base word itself. Bradley (1979) found 
that a combined frequency measure obtained by adding the frequency of the 
baseword to that of its derivatives was a better predictor of lexical decision 
response time for derived words ending with -ness , -er or -m ent  than was the 
frequency of occurrence of the stimulus word alone. Thus there is evidence 
that suffixed words, like prefixed words, have lexical entries closely connected 
with, but not simply subordinate to, the entries of their base words. The 
entries can be accessed via the base word or independently. In support of this 
suggestion one can cite the finding of Manelis and Tharp (1977) that reaction 
time to decide whether or not a pair of letter strings are both words is slower 
if one is suffixed and the other not {printer slander)  than if both are suffixed 
(iprinter drifter)  or both simple (slander blister)', although pseudo-suffixes
(vegetable, rubbish)  do not increase response time (Henderson, Wallis & 
Knight, 1983). Morphological decomposition is an optional strategy; if applied
inappropriately (e.g. when the processor is misled by prin t  +  er to think that 
slander  can be similarly analysed), it can result in increased processing 
difficulty.
Independent evidence in favour of conjoint storage of suffixed words
derived from the same base comes from studies of errors in spontaneous 
speech. Firstly, errors of lexical stress show a curious pattern, as seen in
(15)—(17):
(15) . . .  so we don't have any conflicts.
(16) . . .  and all the syntax texts be lost.
(17) . . .  from my prosodic colleagues.
The stress is always erroneously applied to a syllable which bears stress in a 
morphological relative of the target word (conflict (verb), syntactic, and 
prosody  respectively). Cutler (1981a) proposed that this pattern is a result of 
the way such errors arise: namely from confusion within the lexicon between 
the stress-marked syllables of conjointly stored morphological derivatives 
from the same stem. Interestingly, the direction of interference in these errors 
does not appear to be random. A subset of the lexical stress errors involves 
confusion between the syllable stress marking of a base word and a 
morphologically more complex word, and within this subset more than 
two-thirds involve a derived word produced with stress on the syllable which 
bears it in the base word (as in (17) above); fewer than one-third involve a 
base word stressed on a syllable which bears stress in a derivative (as in (16)), 
a statistically significant difference (Cutler, 1980).
Word formation errors also occur (Fromkin, 1977; McKay, 1979; Cutler,
1980), in which the wrong suffix can be applied (e.g. self-indulgem ent  for 
self-indulgence)  or the correct suffix can be wrongly applied (e.g. expection  for 
expectation). Again, these errors argue that base and suffix are separable in 
speech production. In word formation errors, there is a significant tendency
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for the erroneous derived form to be more transparent with respect to its base 
form than the target form would have been (Cutler, 1980); thus the base 
word expect is better preserved in expection  than in expectation. Similarly,
the fact noted above that stress errors tend to be derived words erroneously 
pronounced with the stress of their base rather than vice versa also suggests 
that derived forms may be preferred which are closer to their base. Some 
experimental evidence also indicates a possible difference between 
transparent and opaque derived forms. For instance, the effect that Bradley
(1979) found for derivations ending with -ness , -e r , or -m ent  (all of them 
transparent), namely that the combined frequency of all derivatives better 
predicted lexical decision reaction time than the individual item frequency, 
did not hold for derivatives with -ion, which are opaque. Similarly Jarvella 
and Snodgrass (1974) found that pairs of words in which the derivation and 
the base had different spelling (de fend -de fensive)  took longer to classify as 
being derived from the same stem than pairs in which the base-to-derivation 
relation was transparent (attain-attainable). Bradley argued that a possible 
explanation of her result was that transparent forms were subordinate to the 
lexical representation of their base forms whereas opaque forms had 
independent representations. However, a more conservative explanation is 
simply that the lexically specified relation between transparent derivatives 
and base is closer than that between opaque derivatives and base; this 
explanation is analogous to the account of lexical representation of regular 
and irregular inflections suggested above.
Productive morphology
Not only do speakers make errors of word formation, they also regularly 
create their own neologisms, that is, use their internalized knowledge of 
morphological structure. Examples of spontaneous neologisms from my own 
collection include:
(18) What I need is a de-mad-ifier.
(19) He just context-free-ized it.
(20) . . . retreat even further from empiricity.
In all such cases, the produced form is transparent with respect to its base 
(with certain apparent exceptions, such as (20), which will be discussed 
below). That this pattern reflects a real preference for transparent derivations 
can be shown in experiments in which subjects are asked to choose between 
alternative derived forms of the same base. Speakers prefer, for instance, 
-ness derivations to -ity derivations when the latter are opaque, i.e. result in a 
change in vowel quality, shift of primary stress, etc. (sinisterness , sinisterity), 
but show no preference between the two suffixes when both derivations are 
transparent (jejuneness , je  n u n  i ty ; Cutler, 1980). Similarly, when subjects are
asked to judge whether or not possible words formed from base plus suffix 
are in fact English words, they accept more words formed with -ness than with 
-ity if the -ity derivatives are opaque (Aronoff and Schvaneveldt, 1978), but 
show no preference either way if both -ness and -ity derivatives are 
transparent (Cutler, 1980). However, there are exceptions to this 
generalization; in some cases derived words which do not preserve all of the 
base word, or which bear primary stress on a syllable different from the 
stressed syllable of the base word, prove to be quite acceptable. For instance, 
in an experiment reported by Cutler (1980), subjects did not show a 
significant preference between excusem ent  and excusion , although the latter 
fails to preserve the final phoneme of the base word. Also, Aronoff and 
Anshen (1981) showed that possible nouns formed from adjectives ending 
with -ible are accepted more often when they are derived with -ity 
(suppressibility) than when they are formed with -ness (suppressibleness) .
Nevertheless, it can be shown that such words are also functionally  
transparent. Thus although suppressibility  bears primary stress on the fourth 
syllable, the second syllable (which bears primary stress in the base) still 
carries a secondary stress. And it is important to note that listeners can 
distinguish stressed from unstressed syllables, but not, in the absence of full 
information about the word, multiple levels of stress (Lieberman, 1965). 
Thus a listener hearing suppressibility  registers the second syllalbe as stressed 
without any way of knowing that a yet more highly stressed syllable is about 
to come. Consonants have not been lost and vowel quality has not changed; 
thus the first two syllables of suppressibility  presumably suffice to enable the 
listener to access the lexical entry (group of lexical entries) for suppress. 
Analogously, empiricicity  in (20) above preserves the first syllables of 
em pirica l, with the second more highly stressed than the first or third.
The case is different, of course, for suppressiv ity . Adding -ity to suppressive  
shifts the primary stress back onto the first syllable, resulting in a change in 
vowel quality. Instead of beginning with [sap] like the rest of the 
morphological relatives of suppress , suppressivity  begins with [sAp] like 
supper, supp lem ent  and suppurate,  and could initially mislead the language 
processor towards the lexical entries for these words. The criteria for 
functional transparency appear to be crucially concerned with the initial 
portions of the word. It has been suggested (Cutler, 1981b) that it might be
possible to specify exactly how much of the base word has to be preserved for 
a derived word to be functionally transparent. For each word there is a 
theoretically earliest point at which it can be identified, namely that point at 
which it becomes distinguishable from other words in the language beginning 
with the same sequence of sounds; Marslen-Wilson (1980) calls this the 
recognition point. In all of the -ibility derivatives which Aronoff and Anshen 
(1981) found to be acceptable, the segmental values and relative syllable 
stress of the base word were preserved up to the base word’s recognition point
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(for suppress, for instance, this is the final sound, at which it diverges from 
supremacy). In Cutler’s (1980) experiments, too, all of the non-transparent 
but acceptable neologisms preserved relative stress and segmental value up to 
the recognition point of the base (for excuse the recognition point is [j]) .
Preserving the base word up to the recognition point allows the hearer 
enough information to be sure of accessing the base word’s lexical entry. Thus 
when speakers have to choose neologisms, they prefer those which contain 
transparently within them their base word or, at least, those segments which 
are crucial for auditory recognition of the base word. The implication of this 
preference is that speakers possess general criteria for the acceptability of 
neologisms which are based on what will be most convenient for the hearer. 
As long as the hearer can access the base word’s lexical entry, the neologisms 
can be understood by the application of morphological principles to the base 
word's meaning, despite the fact that no specific lexical representation for the 
particular nonce-form exists. Not only does the production of neologisms 
draw on a speaker's internalized knowledge of morphological structure, but it 
expresses the speaker’s knowledge of how words are represented in the 
lexicon and how a morphologically complex word may be accessed via its 
base.
SYNTACTIC CO M PLEX ITY
This final section considers three ways in which lexical representations may 
incorporate syntactic complexity. Firstly, there is systematic ambiguity— one 
word with more than one form class. Secondly, there is the holistic 
representation of multi-word units. And thirdly, there is the case of 
subcategorization restrictions on verbs, a lexically specified syntactic 
constraint.
Systematic ambiguity
A special case of lexical ambiguity arises when one considers ambiguity across 
form class. Words with multiple unrelated meanings do not necessarily 
maintain form class across meanings (e.g. bear)\ moreover, huge numbers of 
words can be used— with closely related meanings— in more than one form 
class, particularly as nouns and verbs (doubt, crown , fuse , etc.). Syntactic 
structure usually constrains interpretation completely with respect to form 
class; one might think that syntactic structure would provide sufficient cues on 
the basis of which to select the correct, and only the correct, reading of a word 
ambiguous across form class where the only alternative interpretation was of 
a form class different from that demanded by the context. Therefore, it might 
be expected that no evidence of lexical activation of the alternative 
interpretations should be found. However, Prather and Swinney (1977),
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using Swinney’s cross-modal priming task described earlier, found that when 
ambiguous words of this type were incorporated in sentences in which the 
syntactic context completely constrained which reading was appropriate— the 
noun readings were preceded by th e , the verb readings by io-words related 
to both the appropriate and the inappropriate (different form class) mean­
ing were primed. Moreover, this was true both of unsystematic 
(non-meaning-related) and systematic (meaning-related) ambiguities. This 
finding suggests that multiple meanings of words may be stored together 
irrespective of form class, i.e. the lexicon can contain syntactically 
heterogeneous word conglomerates.
A similar finding to Prather and Swinney's is that of Tanenhaus, Leiman, 
and Seidenberg (1979), who found that presentation of a syntactically
ambiguous word in an unambiguous syntactic context (e.g. ‘they all rose’) 
significantly facilitated naming latency to an associate of the contextually
inappropriate meaning of the ambiguous word (e.g. flower). Again, this
suggests that despite constraining syntactic context both noun and verb 
readings of the ambiguous word were momentarily activated.
A somewhat different picture is offered by an experiment conducted by 
Ryder and Walker (1982). Subjects were asked to judge whether or not two 
words were semantically related. When one of the words was semantically 
ambiguous (d u ty - ta x )  reaction times were longer than when both words were 
unambiguous {c ity -tow n).  Moreover, this was true irrespective of whether the 
dominant or infrequent meaning was required for the relatedness judgement 
(duty-responsibility ', d u ty - ta x ) .  Systematic (cross-category) ambiguities, on 
the other hand, only produced an interference effect when the judgement 
involved the infrequent reading (<cart-carry ), not when it involved the 
dominant reading (cart-w agon);  the latter type of pair was responded to as 
quickly as unambiguous pairs. Ryder and Walker argued that in the access of 
cross-category ambiguities only the primary meaning (that is, the primary 
form class) is activated at first, in contrast to the case of semantic ambiguity, 
where all meanings are automatically activated at once.
An analogous conclusion can be drawn from an experiment by Forster and 
Bednall (1976), who measured subjects’ reaction time to judge the 
acceptability of two-word strings, in each case a noun or verb preceded by to 
or the. When systematically ambiguous words were presented in their 
dominant sense (the cage, to b lam e),  reaction time was as fast as to 
unambiguous words (the w ife , to greet)', but reaction times to the infrequent 
senses of systematically ambiguous words (to cage, the b lam e)  were 
significantly slower.
Flow are these results to be reconciled with the findings that appear to show 
that all meanings of a systematic ambiguity are activated? It should be noted 
that both the Prather and Swinney and the Tanenhaus et al. studies 
demonstrated an effect of semantic priming due to the contextually
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inappropriate meaning, the dependent variable in each case being time to 
respond to a word which was not itself the systematically ambiguous word. As 
such they constitute robust evidence that priming did occur. The Ryder and 
Walker and the Forster and Bednall studies, on the other hand, measured 
reaction time to some judgement made about the systematically ambiguous 
word itself— its relatedness to another word, or its acceptability in 
combination with a preceding function word. Their findings are quite 
compatible with the suggestion that although both meanings are accessed, the 
dominant form class interpretation is retrieved first and is therefore able to be 
judged more rapidly than the later-activated infrequent interpretation. In this 
there seems to be a real difference between non-systematic and systematic 
ambiguity: although in both cases all meanings of a word constitute part of the 
same lexical grouping, in the case of systematic ambiguity the less frequent 
interpretation may only be accessed via the dominant interpretation.
Multi-word units
A second way in which a lexical entry may be syntactically complex is that a 
single meaning may be associated with a string of words. An obvious instance 
of a multi-word unit expressing a single meaning is that of idioms; the 
meaning of an idiom cannot by definition be expressed as a concatenation of 
the meanings of its component parts. The idiomatic meaning of ‘let the cat out 
of the bag1, for instance, has nothing to do with cats or bags. Linguists (e.g. 
Fraser, 1970) have claimed that idioms function in the language not as 
ph rases but as single lexical items, and that they are listed in the lexicon just 
as any other word is listed. Indeed, evidence that idioms are represented as 
holistic units in the mental lexicon was presented by Swinney and Cutler 
(1979) using a task which was analogous to lexical decision and sentence
classification, namely phrase classification, in which subjects were presented 
with strings of words and asked to determine whether or not they were
acceptable English phrases. Idiomatic phrases were matched with control
ph rases which were constructed by substituting for one word in the idiom
another word of equal length and equal or higher frequency (e.g. for ‘break
the ice’ the control was ‘break the cup’). Reaction time to classify idioms was
significantly faster than classification time for the control phrases, a result
which was interpreted as evidence that the idioms had been accessed, in their
idiomatic sense, as units; no extra time was required to integrate the separate
word meanings and arrive at an acceptable interpretation of the phrase, as
would have to have been done for the control phrases.
Note that an alternative view of the lexical representation of idioms has 
been proposed by Bobrow and Bell (1973), namely that idioms are indeed 
represented as units, but in a separate idiom list; when an idiom is 
comprehended, a literal reading is first computed and only when that fails is
the phrasal meaning accessed from the idiom list. The Swinney and Cutler 
results provide definite evidence against this claim. Bobrow and Bell based 
their suggestion not on results of an on-line processing task, but on which 
interpretation subjects reported for a string like ‘kick the bucket’ (which can 
be meant either literally or idiomatically). The strings were presented under 
biasing conditions which consisted of prior presentation of (a) a number of 
idioms, or (b) a number of literal phrases; idiomatic readings tended to be 
reported when idioms had been presented, literal readings when literal 
phrases had been presented. Bobrow and Bell claimed that their subjects 
could adopt or abandon a special idiom mode of processing; but Swinney and 
Cutler pointed out that Bobrow and Bell’s results could equally well be 
explained as reflecting a mental decision about the most appropriate meaning 
on which to base a response.
In a second experiment, Swinney and Cutler compared idioms with 
different levels of syntactic frozenness. Frozen idiomatic phrases convey their 
idiomatic meaning in only one syntactic form (e.g. 'jump in the lake’ cannot 
undergo the simplest syntactic operations: ‘Joylene’s jumping in the lake was
desired' does not convey the idiomatic reading), whereas others are less frozen 
or virtually unfrozen (‘bury the hatchet’, for instance, retains its idiomatic 
interpretation through most syntactic permutations). No difference was found 
between more frozen and less frozen idioms; all showed an equivalent 
advantage over literal control strings.
In a further unpublished experiment carried out at the University of Sussex, 
idioms with literal interpretations (such as ‘break the ice’ and ‘kick the 
bucket’) were compared with idioms which have no literal interpretation (e.g. 
‘by and large’, ‘in the know’); again both types of idiom showed an equivalent 
reaction time advantage in comparison with literal strings.
Thus it appears to be the case that multi-word idioms have unitary lexical 
representation. Supporting evidence for this model comes from an 
experiment by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, and Antos (1978) who found that 
comprehension of idiomatic phrases in contexts which demanded their 
idiomatic reading took no longer (in fact was often faster) than 
comprehension of the same phrases in contexts requiring a literal 
interpretation. Moreover, Gibbs (1980) found that paraphrase judgements 
were faster for the idiomatic than for the literal reading of an idiom 
irrespective of whether the idiomatic string had been preceded by appropriate 
preceding context, or no context. These results indicate that accessing the 
idiomatic lexical entry may be easier than accessing the multiple-entries for 
the separate items in the string; which in turn suggest that there should in 
general be a bias to perceive idiomatic readings. This is indeed the case. Van 
Lancker and Canter (1981) had subjects record idioms in contexts which 
forced either literal interpretation or the idiomatic reading, then excised the 
relevant strings from context and played them to listeners in an attempt to
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determine whether the productions had included disambiguating acoustic 
information. They found that listeners could readily distinguish the idiomatic 
and literal interpretations one from the other when they were presented 
together; but when the productions were presented in isolation, listeners 
showed a strong preference for the idiomatic interpretation irrespective of 
the context from which the utterance had been taken. And in another 
unpublished study by Swinney and Cutler, carried out at Tufts University, 
phoneme-monitoring reaction time was measured to targets immediately 
following idiomatic phrases: in contexts which were biased towards the 
idiomatic interpretation of the phrase, no difference was found between the 
idiomatic and matched control phrases, but when the context was biased 
towards the literal interpretation, reaction time to targets following the 
potential idioms was somewhat longer than to targets following the 
unambiguous controls— indicating interference from competing access of the 
idiomatic reading.
This is not to say that when an idiomatic entry is available, no activation of 
the component words’ literal meaning takes place; it does, as has been shown 
by another cross-modal priming study by Swinney (1981), in which words 
in an idiomatic string (e.g. ‘kick the bucket’) primed related words as they 
occurred (‘hit’ was primed as subjects heard ‘kick’, ‘pail’ was primed as they 
heard ‘bucket’), as well as words related to the idiomatic meaning of the 
whole phrase (‘die’). But as we would expect from all the evidence cited in 
this chapter, it is not the lexical access process itself which becomes more 
difficult— resulting in a reaction time decrement— but post-access decisions 
of one kind or another.
A further reflection of the unitary lexical status of idiomatic strings appears 
in the results of another unpublished study by Swinney and myself. We 
reasoned that if idioms are unitarily represented, then their syntactic structure 
(particularly for the more frozen idioms) is predictable. This fact might be 
then expected to be reflected in speech production processes. It is established, 
for example, that the relative strength of syntactic boundaries influences the 
amount of phrase-final lengthening which occurs immediately before a 
boundary, so that speakers produce a greater amount of lengthening before 
boundaries dominated by high nodes in the syntactic structure tree of an 
utterance than before boundaries dominated by lower nodes (Cooper, Paccia, 
and Lapointe, 1978). Thus we predicted that speakers would treat syntactic 
boundaries occurring within an idiom as less strong than the same boundaries 
occurring within the same phrase used in a non-idiomatic sense, and that this 
difference would result in less phrase-final lengthening before the boundary 
in the idiom than in the literal version. We chose seven idioms which could 
also be interpreted literally, and embedded each in two disambiguating 
paragraph contexts, one appropriate for the literal and the other for the 
idiomatic reading. An example is given in (21); the idiom ‘let the cat out of
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the bag’ contains an internal boundary before the prepositional phrase ‘out of 
the bag’.
(21) a. We have to keep the animals apart while we’re in the car or they 
might start fighting and distract the driver. So please be careful not to 
let the cat out of the bag. I’ll keep the dog in this basket, 
b. We want the party to be a complete surprise to her, and we’d be 
really upset if she found out. So please be careful not to let the cat out 
of the bag. I’ll be responsible for getting her there on time.
Six speakers who were unaware of the purpose of the experiment recorded 
all fourteen paragraphs. The durations of the syllables preceding the syntactic 
boundary (in (21), the duration of ‘cat’ which preceded the prepositional 
phrase ‘out of the bag’) were measured with the aid of a waveform editing 
program. Table 2.6 presents the results. This difference was statistically 
significant (F,( 1, 5) =  9.68, p  <  0.03) and thus provided support for the 
prediction that syntactic boundaries within idioms have less strength in speech 
production than boundaries within comparable non-idiomatic phrases.
Similar results were reported by van Lancker, Canter and Terbeek
(1981), who also found that other phonological processes sensitive to syntactic 
boundary strength produced evidence that the same boundaries were weaker 
in an idiomatic than in a literal version of a given phrase.
Finally, there is an interesting parallel between idioms and ambiguous 
words to be noted. Recall (from the section on lexical ambiguity above) that 
sentence classification time for sentences containing an ambiguous word is 
longer than for unambiguous sentences. This is also the case with sentences 
containing an idiom which could also have a literal interpretation; and idioms 
are also associated with longer reaction time for same-different meaning 
judgements on pairs of sentences (both results from Brannon, 1975). As we 
would expect on the basis of the earlier explanations, this was true only of 
idioms which could also be literal phrases. Idioms which had no literal sense 
( ‘in the know’), produced significantly faster reaction times in the sentence 
classification task than strings which could be either literal or idiomatic. Like 
ambiguous words, therefore, idioms can take longer to integrate into the
Table 2.6 Mean duration (msec) of syllable 
produced before a syntactic boundary in 
idiomatic and literal use of the same phrases
Average duration 
Idiom Control
228 240
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context of a whole sentence— as long as they allow more than one 
interpretation.
The idiom studies show that multi-word units can have holistic lexical 
representation. We should suspect that idioms are not the only such 
syntactically complex unit; for instance, compound nouns (ihotrod, garbage 
truck) are similarly very likely to have unitary entries. The same goes for 
many familiar phrases (‘How do you do?’). No relevant experimental 
evidence has as yet been collected on these types of phrase.
Verb subcategorization
Another possible case of syntactic complexity in the lexicon arises in the form 
of restrictions on syntactic contexts in which a word can occur, of which verbs 
provide the classic case: transitive versus intransitive, complementizing versus 
non-complementizing. Some verbs can take no object or complement: ‘Bazza 
exists’, but not ‘Bazza exists a peanut’, or ‘Bazza exists that the peanut was 
rotten’. Others can take an object or not: ‘Bazza eats’; ‘Bazza eats a peanut’. 
Still others can take a complement or not: Bazza stated his nam e’; Bazza stated 
that the peanut was rotten’. Others must have a complement: ‘Bazza seems to be 
a peanut’. Others can have all three modes: ‘Bazza believes’; ‘Bazza believes 
m e’; ‘Bazza believes that the peanut is edible’. Is this kind of constraint 
incorporated in the lexical entries of verbs, and if so, does it affect the ease 
with which different kind of verbs are processed?
Fodor, Garrett, and Bever (1968) compared complementizing with 
non-complementizing verbs and found that sentences containing 
complementizing verbs were more difficult to paraphrase. Subjects also made 
more errors with sentences containing complementizing verbs on a task in 
which they had to rearrange shuffled sentences— although there was no 
difference between the two types of sentence with respect to time taken to 
complete rearrangement. Fodor et al. argued that lexical access reveals 
whether or not the verb can take a complement and proposed an on-line 
effect of this type of complexity of the following kind: if a verb allows more 
than one possible syntactic continuation (e.g. believe), then more hypotheses will 
be computed about the syntactic structure of the sentence than in the case of a 
syntactically simpler verb (e.g. eat). This was also argued by Bever (1970).
However, on the balance of the evidence it appears most likely that verb 
complexity does not exercise its effects on lexical access time. Hakes (1971) 
replicated Fodor et al.'s paraphrase results, but failed to find any effect at all 
of verb complexity on phoneme-monitoring reaction time. Hakes (1972a) 
again failed to find a phoneme-monitoring effect of verb structure, and also 
reported an unpublished result of Garrett and Chodorow, in which verb 
complexity had no effect on time to decide whether or not a given word had 
appeared in a sentence.
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In line with our earlier arguments, we would therefore suspect that if no 
effect of verb complexity on lexical access time can be detected, then the 
added difficulty associated with complementizing verbs in the paraphrase 
and sentence rearrangement tasks must be due to post-access 
processes— integration of a complete sentence representation. Indeed, 
Chodorow (1979) reported that lists of words were recalled worse when recall 
was also required of sentences with indeterminate structure, in comparison 
with sentences with simple transitive verbs, or with complementizing verbs 
followed by the complementizer//?^/ (which resolves the ambiguity). Recall 
that lexical ambiguity was also associated with a performance decrement in 
this task. Thus the existence of more than one possible sentence 
interpretation seems to be a factor which causes processing difficulty; the 
locus of the difficulty is however not at the lexical access level, either— as 
argued earlier— in the case of lexical ambiguity or in the case of verb 
structure ambiguity. (Note that complementizing verbs did not produce a 
performance decrement when they were followed by that, only if the structure 
of the sentence was temporarily indeterminate. Not surprisingly, the per­
formance deficit for complementizing verbs in the paraphrase task also dis­
appeared when the explicit complementizer was included (Hakes, 1972b).)
Verb subcategorization thus appears to be yet another case in which 
variable amounts of lexically represented information do not have an effect 
on difficulty of lexical access per se ; yet the same information can lead to 
multiple possible interpretations of a sentence becoming available, which in 
turn can result in added processing difficulty in a task requiring computation 
of and/or decision about the meaning of a sentence as a whole.
CO N CLU SIO N
The purpose of this chapter was to consider all the various ways in which 
lexical representation of words could deviate from simplicity, and to 
determine whether it would be possible, despite the heterogeneity of the 
phenomena involved, to draw some generalization from the available 
evidence. This indeed proved possible, and two clear conclusions have 
emerged, namely that lexical representations are very rarely simple, but that 
the process of lexical access is not made easier or more difficult by the 
complexity of the contents of the lexical entry. In the first section it was 
shown, for instance, that processing an ambiguous word involves access to all 
its semantic representations. Similarly, access of the entry for a lexical 
negative provides the information that its meaning includes negation, and 
access of the lexical entry for a restrictive verb selects the set of concepts of 
which it can be predicated. An exception to the representation of semantic 
complexity in the lexicon, however, is the disputed case of semantic 
decomposition, which, it was argued, is not lexically represented at all; not
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only are decomposable words no harder to process in any way, they simply do 
not seem to be decomposed at any level of processing. In no case was any type 
of semantic complexity found to be associated with greater difficulty of lexical 
access, when all confounding factors were controlled.
In the second section it was seen that morphologically complex words are 
also no more difficult to access from the lexicon than morphologically simple 
words; but there was abundant evidence that the mental representations of 
words contain information about morphological structure, and that speakers 
draw on this information in creating new words. The third section showed that 
a single lexical entry can embrace more than one form class and even a 
phrasal unit, and that information about the complement structure of verbs is 
also lexically represented; again, none of these factors was found to cause 
lexical access to become more difficult.
On the other hand, it was shown that many types of lexical complexity can 
lead to greater processing difficulty just in the case that (a) the task taps the 
time to construct a representation of an entire sentence and/or to make a 
judgement about it, and (b) the effect of the lexically complex word is to 
enable more than one representation of the sentence to be acceptable. The 
locus of the processing difficulty is not, however, at the level at which the 
information is retrieved from the lexicon; it is at the level at which it is 
integrated into a representation of the sentence as a whole.
The chapter began with a reference to a lexically simple word, wombat. Let 
us now consider what the lexical representation of a complex word might be 
like. Discount is a word which is semantically ambiguous: it can mean 
‘deduction from price’ or ‘not take seriously, not consider’. It has more than 
one form class, with all meanings originally systematically related; but the 
verb-meaning ‘deduct from price’ is closer to the noun-meaning than is the 
verb-meaning ‘not take seriously’. It is morphologically complex, consisting of
a prefix plus stem. The prefix incorporates a representation of negation (see 
Figure 2.1).
Although discount can be stressed on either the first or second syllable, 
segmental quality remains the same (there is no vowel reduction), so that 
we can consider the string [d isk a o n t]  as a fair representation of all 
interpretations of the word. Stress varies with the speaker: some give the 
word initial stress in all readings; others give the noun initial stress and the 
verb final stress irrespective of meaning; still others give initial stress to the 
verb, as to the noun, in the ‘deduct from price’ reading (‘they gave me a 
discount’; ‘they discounted it for m e’), but use final stress in the other verb 
reading (‘We discounted the tobacco firm’s lung cancer statistics’). I am one 
of the latter group; in my lexicon the price-deduction verb and noun are 
closely connected, with the ‘not consider’ verb separate.
Let us consider, then, that discount has three basic nodes (lexical entries), 
two of which are systematically related. Any of these nodes can be separately
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Figure 2.1 The lexical representation of discount
accessed; but if discount  is heard with initial stress, of the two possible 
meanings to be activated the noun one will be first, the verb second (see 
‘Systematic a m b ig u ity ’). On the other hand, access of any node activates the 
others (see ‘Lexical a m b ig u ity ’). D iscount  can also be accessed via its stem, 
count  (see ‘Prefixed w o rd s '); this itself is a node of the conglomerate lexical 
entry for c o u n t , which is semantically and systematically ambiguous, having 
one noun reading (‘noblem an’) unrelated to the main verb meaning 
(‘enum erate’), which itself has a closely associated noun ( ‘enum eration’). 
Thus count  has three major lexical nodes associated with it, plus a node for 
count  + prefix  and another for count  + s u f f ix ; the former has a major branch 
for dis-, another for ac-, another for m is-,  and a fourth which leads to 
v iscoun t; the suffix node is connected to entries for counter  (itself with half a 
dozen different readings), coun tab le , countess  etc.; the prefix and suffix nodes 
together dominate nodes for accountan t, uncoun tab le , etc. Entries for any 
kind of multi-word unit which includes count  (lose c o u n t ; n o -a cco u n t; d o n ’t 
count y o u r  ch ickens)  will also be associated with the conglomerate. Semantic 
groupings include a separate cluster of count  (nobleman), coun tess , and 
v iscoun t; a major grouping of every word that has anything at all to do with
count count countCOUNT
prefix 
+ count
count ♦ 
suffix
countcount
count count
mis + 
count
count count
count count
dis + count 
+ NEG
pron: /d iskaon t/ 
stress: 1 
synt. categ.: N 
number marking: . .
mea n i ng: 'reduction  
in  p r ic e '
dis + count 
+ NEG
pron.: /d iskaon t/ 
stress: 2 
synt. categ.: V 
tense marking: . . 
selection
restrictions: . . . 
meaning: 'no t take 
seriously '
dis + count 
+ NEG
pron: /d iskaont/ 
stress: 1 
synt. categ.: V 
tense marking: . . . 
selection
restrictions . . . 
meaning: ‘reduce in
price  '
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the numeration meaning of count  (including all the readings of discount); a 
‘negative’ grouping comprising only the various readings of discount and 
m isco u n t , etc. Within each node for discount  there will be, at least, its sound 
representation and its meaning, a representation of its syntactic category, and 
any further refinements of this (discount the verb can only be transitive, for 
instance), how it should be inflected, its stress pattern, a negative marker. 
Besides all the structural connections within the lexical conglomerate, each 
word and semantic grouping will have associative connections with 
semantically related words, rebate , disregard , n u m b e r , b a ro n , to k e n , or 
whatever.
In contrast, a word like w om bat  may have a number of associative 
connections (em u, m udd le -headed , etc.), but no structural connections at all. 
It is clear, however, that the w om bats  are in the minority— there are many 
more words like discount. Lexical complexity is the norm. Under these 
circumstances, it is fortunate that lexical complexity does not in itself cause 
language processing difficulty.
N O TE
1. Under  appropriate  conditions phoneme-monitoring response time also provides a 
measure of the time required to understand the target-bearing word itself; see Cutler 
and Norris (1979) and Foss and Blank (1980) for further discussion of these issues. In 
all the phoneme-monitoring studies reported below, the target-bearing item followed 
the word on which the independent variable was manipulated.
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